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 II.-280 
THE EXPANSIVE SCOPE OF THE 
MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION AFTER OUR 
LADY OF GUADALUPE SCHOOL v. 
MORRISSEY-BERRU 
Abstract: On July 8th, 2020, the United States Supreme Court held in Our Lady 
of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru that two parochial school teachers, 
Kristen Biel and Agnes-Morrissey-Berru, were ministers for purposes of the First 
Amendment’s ministerial exception. This meant that the First Amendment barred 
their respective employment discrimination actions notwithstanding the merit of 
their claims. When the Court first recognized the ministerial exception in 2012, 
in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission, it determined that an employee qualified as a minister 
through a multi-factor, totality of the circumstances analysis. Yet, in reaching its 
conclusion in Our Lady of Guadalupe School, the Court focused predominantly 
on one factor—whether the employees performed religious functions. This 
Comment argues that the Court’s sole focus on religious function has significant-
ly expanded the scope of the ministerial exception, such that more employees of 
more religious institutions are likely to qualify as ministers and thus lose their 
federal antidiscrimination employment protections. Given the policy interests at 
stake, courts applying the ministerial exception after Our Lady of Guadalupe 
School should recognize that a broad reading invites exploitation and interpret 
the opinion in its narrowest form. 
INTRODUCTION 
Religious institutions generally must comply with federal employment 
antidiscrimination statutes, and employees of religious institutions may bring 
claims for relief against their employers under such statutes.1 Yet, depending 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See 3 N. PETER LAREAU, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW § 53.12(2)(a) (explaining that federal 
statutes prohibit religious institution employers from discriminating against their employees on the 
basis of sex, race, and national origin). Title VII provides religious employers with a statutory exemp-
tion from otherwise prohibited religious discrimination to allow for the expression of religious prefer-
ence, but it does not permit discrimination for other protected classes, such as sex, race, or national 
origin. See id. (noting the statutory prohibitions against sex, race, and national origin discrimination 
still apply to religious employers); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–1 (rendering the subchapter inapplica-
ble to religious employers who seek to make employment decisions on the basis of religion); Our 
Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2072 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(noting that religious institutions must comply with “generally applicable laws” (citing Emp’t Div. 
Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879–82 (1990))). See generally 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e–2 (establishing unlawful employment practices under Title VII, which include “to discharge 
any individual . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”). 
2021] Our Lady of Guadalupe School’s Expansion of the Ministerial Exception II.-281 
on the role of the employee, a religious institution may be entitled to assert an 
affirmative defense to such a claim, known as the ministerial exception.2 The 
ministerial exception forecloses courts from applying employment antidiscrim-
ination statutes to disputes between religious institutions and their ministers.3 
Thus, if an employee bringing suit qualifies as a minister for purposes of the 
ministerial exception, the First Amendment bars the employee’s discrimination 
claim against the religious institution, even if the claim is otherwise viable.4 As 
such, the predominant inquiry in ministerial exception cases is often whether 
an employee qualifies as a minister and fits within the ambit of the exception.5 
In July 2020, in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, the 
Supreme Court held that two Catholic school elementary teachers were ministers 
for purposes of the ministerial exception.6 The Court’s decision reversed the 
                                                                                                                           
 2 George L. Blum, Annotation, Application of First Amendment’s “Ministerial Exception” or 
“Ecclesiastical Exception” to Federal Civil Rights Claims, 41 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 445, I § 3 (2009) (ex-
plaining that, for certain employees, religious institutions may escape liability for discrimination). An 
affirmative defense bars the plaintiff’s claim if the judge or jury recognizes the defense. 5 CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1270 (3d ed. 2020). 
Notably, the ministerial exception does not exclusively apply to clergy or religious leadership; “lay em-
ployees” can also qualify as ministers for purposes of the exception. See Blum, supra, at I. § 2 (noting 
that the ministerial exception applies to “lay employees” when they perform functions that resemble 
those of a minister); see also Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp. 
Opportunity Comm’n, 565 U.S. 171, 190 (2012) (declining to restrict the ministerial exception to the 
“head of a religious congregation”). 
 3 Blum, supra note 2, at I § 3. The ministerial exception is a judge-made doctrine that is constitu-
tionally rooted in the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, commonly 
referred to as “the Religion Clauses.” Id. at I §§ 2–3; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. (“Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . .”). The 
Establishment Clause prohibits “excessive government entanglement” with religion, or in other words, 
requires separation between church and state. Blum, supra note 2, at I § 3. The Free Exercise Clause 
guarantees individuals and religious institutions autonomy in how they practice faith. Id. Thus, the 
ministerial exception derives from a dual notion. See id. (explaining the ministerial exception derives 
from Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause concerns). First, that applying secular standards, 
such as established antidiscrimination statutes, to a religious institution’s choice of minister consti-
tutes excessive government entanglement because it requires courts to concern themselves with inter-
nal religious operations and decisions. Id. Second, that government involvement in a religious institu-
tion’s choice of minister fundamentally upends the institution’s autonomy in carrying out its religious 
mission. Id. 
 4 See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 195 n.4 (clarifying the way the exception operates). 
 5 See Blum, supra note 2, at I § 2 (noting that the boundaries of the doctrine are still unclear). 
 6 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2055. Our Lady of Guadalupe School was a consoli-
dated action of two similar Ninth Circuit cases. See id. at 2060 (noting the procedural history); Mor-
rissey-Berru v. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 769 F. App’x 460, 460–61 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding that 
the teacher was not a minister for purposes of the exception), rev’d, Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 
S. Ct. at 2069; Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603, 605 (9th Cir. 2018) (same), rev’d, Our Lady of 
Guadalupe Sch.,140 S. Ct. at 2069. Kristen Biel was a fifth-grade teacher who brought a claim under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act when her employer did not renew her contract after she sought to 
take time off to undergo chemotherapy treatment. Biel, 911 F.3d at 605; see also Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (providing the statutory basis for Biel’s 
claim). Morrissey-Berru brought a claim under the Age Discrimination Employment Act when the 
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United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Biel v. St. 
James School and Morrissey-Berru v. Our Lady of Guadalupe School.7 The 
Ninth Circuit had held that in order to determine whether an employee is a min-
ister for purposes of the ministerial exception, a court must perform a holistic 
analysis—analyzing not only the employee’s religious functions, but also other 
factors such as the employee’s religious title and training.8 In Our Lady of Gua-
dalupe School, the Supreme Court curtailed the Ninth Circuit’s totality of the 
circumstances analysis, instead holding that what is most pertinent in determin-
ing whether an employee is a minister is the employee’s religious function.9 
This Comment argues that Our Lady of Guadalupe School problematical-
ly expanded the scope of the ministerial exception by making religious func-
tion the heart of the exception.10 Part I introduces the ministerial exception and 
describes the factual and procedural history of Our Lady of Guadalupe 
School.11 Part II discusses the specific reasoning set out in Our Lady of Guada-
lupe School and acknowledges Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting arguments.12 
Finally, Part III explores the policy considerations that underlie why courts 
should narrowly construe the ministerial exception and suggests an interpreta-
tion of the opinion that might keep the exception more confined.13 
I. THE FOUNDATION OF OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE  
SCHOOL V. MORRISSEY-BERRU 
When the United States Supreme Court heard Our Lady of Guadalupe 
School v. Morrissey-Berru in 2020, it had not evaluated a ministerial exception 
dispute since 2012, when it heard Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church & School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.14 Section A 
of this Part explores the Supreme Court’s decision in Hosanna-Tabor where it 
                                                                                                                           
school allegedly replaced her with a younger teacher. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 
2057–58; see also Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 
(providing the statutory basis for Morrissey-Berru’s claim). 
 7 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2055, 2069; see also Morrissey-Berru, 769 F. App’x 
at 460–61 (holding plaintiff was not a minister for purposes of the exception); Biel, 911 F.3d at 605 
(same). 
 8 See Biel, 911 F.3d 609 (stating that under Hosanna-Tabor, one characteristic alone is not 
enough for the ministerial exception to apply); see also Morrissey-Berru, 769 F. App’x at 461 (same). 
 9 See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2056–61, 2066 (employing a more function-
focused analysis to reach the opposite conclusion from the Ninth Circuit). 
 10 See infra notes 102–140 and accompanying text (discussing the way in which function expands 
the exception and advocating for a narrower construal). 
 11 See infra notes 14–67 and accompanying text. 
 12 See infra notes 68–101 and accompanying text. 
 13 See infra notes 102–140 and accompanying text. 
 14 See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2055 (2020) (pointing to 
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion as its latest ministerial exception decision (citing 565 U.S. 171 (2012))). 
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first recognized the ministerial exception.15 Sections B and C discuss the fac-
tual and procedural backgrounds of Biel v. St. James School and Morrissey-
Berru v. Our Lady of Guadalupe School—the two 2018 and 2019 Ninth Circuit 
decisions that the Supreme Court consolidated in Our Lady of Guadalupe 
School.16 Finally, Section D discusses the potential circuit split the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s decisions created and the corresponding procedural history that brought 
the cases before the Supreme Court.17 
A. The Supreme Court First Recognizes the Ministerial Exception 
The Supreme Court first recognized the ministerial exception in 2012 in 
Hosanna-Tabor.18 The plaintiff, Cheryl Perich, was a “called” teacher and em-
ployee of Hosanna-Tabor, a Lutheran elementary school.19 Perich brought a 
discrimination action against the school under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act (ADA) when the school terminated her after she took disability leave.20 
The school moved for summary judgment and claimed that the ministerial ex-
ception barred Perich’s suit because she qualified as a minister.21 Writing for a 
unanimous Court, Chief Justice Roberts affirmed the existence of the ministe-
rial exception.22 Moreover, the Court held that the Establishment and Free Ex-
ercise Clauses of the First Amendment foreclose government involvement in a 
                                                                                                                           
 15 See infra notes 18–34 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 35–60 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 61–67 and accompanying text. 
 18 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188–89. Although the Supreme Court had not yet considered the 
ministerial exception prior to 2012, lower courts had accepted and applied it as early as 1972. Id. at 
196 (citing McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558 (5th Cir. 1972)); see also Zoë Robinson, 
What Is a “Religious Institution”?, 55 B.C. L. REV. 181, 199 (2014) (noting ministerial exception 
cases were pervasive in the lower courts after Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964). Fur-
thermore, by 2012, the courts of appeals had also uniformly accepted and applied the ministerial ex-
ception. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188. 
 19 Hosanna Tabor, 565 U.S. at 177–78. 
 20 Id. at 177–80 (citing Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 
(2009)). Perich filed her claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which in turn, 
brought suit against Hosanna-Tabor on her behalf. Id. at 179–80. Hosanna-Tabor employed both 
“called” teachers and “lay” teachers. Id. at 177. “Called,” as a designation, indicated that the teacher 
had been summoned to her “vocation by God through a congregation,” and could thus receive the 
formal title “Minister of Religion, Commissioned.” Id. Teachers could become a “called” teacher if 
they met required academic standards, which they could accomplish by completing a certain training 
program at a Lutheran-affiliated university. Id. The school did not require “lay” teachers to receive 
such training, although they had the same responsibilities as “called” teachers. Id. 
 21 Id. at 180. The District Court agreed that Perich was a minister for purposes of the exception 
and granted Hosanna-Tabor summary judgment. Id. at 180–81. The Sixth Circuit reversed and re-
manded, holding that, although the ministerial exception existed, it did not apply to Perich’s employ-
ment. Id. at 181. 
 22 Id. at 181. 
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religious institution’s relationship with its employees that are ministers.23 It 
reasoned that a religious institution’s choice of minister has substantial reli-
gious implications, as ministers are responsible for communicating religious 
messages and guiding the members of the religious community in faith.24 As 
such, the First Amendment bestows a freedom on a given religious institution 
to be free from secular government intervention into the selection of its minis-
ters and to be free to curate its “faith and mission” through ministerial ap-
pointments.25 Thus, the ministerial exception derives from the notion that 
courts cannot apply employment antidiscrimination statutes to minister em-
ployees because such statutes would effectively force a religious institution to 
hire or retain certain ministers based on secular guidelines and objectives.26 
Ultimately, the Court determined that Perich qualified as a minister for 
purposes of the ministerial exception and dismissed her employment discrimi-
nation action against Hosanna-Tabor.27 The Court declined to adopt a “rigid 
formula” when it determined that Perich qualified as a minister.28 Instead, the 
Court applied a totality of the circumstances analysis and considered four fac-
tors specific to Perich’s employment that, when taken together as a whole, in-
dicated she was a minister.29 First, the Court highlighted Perich’s formal title 
of minister that the school gave her.30 Second, the Court noted the substance of 
her title by emphasizing the significant amount of religious training that the 
school required Perich to complete before it commissioned her as a minister.31 
Third, the Court considered how Perich embraced the title and presented her-
                                                                                                                           
 23 Id. at 188. The Court reasoned that the founders drafted the Religion Clauses to create a distinct 
separation between church and state and to preserve religious autonomy in decisions concerning faith, 
religious doctrine, and church administration. Id. at 183–86. The Court noted that important historical 
context influenced the founders when drafting these clauses. Id. at 183. Many colonists had left Eng-
land to escape the control of the Church of England and to be free to choose their own ministers and 
practice their faith. Id. Yet, to their dismay, the Crown continued to exercise control over the ap-
pointment of ministers in colonial churches. See id. As such, religious autonomy in the selection of 
ministers was a key consideration behind the Religion Clauses. Id. 
 24 See id. at 188, 192 (suggesting a minister is one who embodies the religious institution’s beliefs 
and plays a part in “conveying the Church’s message and carrying out its mission”). 
 25 See id. at 188–89 (explaining the way the First Amendment protections manifest). 
 26 See id. (describing the conflict of employment antidiscrimination statutes and First Amendment 
guarantees). 
 27 Id. at 194. 
 28 Id. at 190. 
 29 See id. at 191–92 (noting multiple characteristics of Perich’s employment that, when looked at 
holistically, suggested that she was a minister). 
 30 Id. When Hosanna-Tabor offered her a position as a “called” teacher, it issued Perich a “diplo-
ma of vocation.” Id. at 191. The Court reasoned that in giving Perich the title of “called” teacher, 
Hosanna-Tabor effectively presented her to the community in such a way that distinguished her from 
the average members of the congregation. Id. 
 31 Id. at 191. The requirements, which took Perich six years to complete, included completing 
eight college-level theology courses, obtaining endorsement from her local Synod district, and having 
a congregation elect her by recognizing God’s call to her to teach. Id. 
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self to the community as a minister.32 Finally, the Court looked to Perich’s job 
duties, which included teaching religion classes, leading her students in prayer, 
and occasionally leading chapel service.33 The Court stipulated that these du-
ties indicated Perich had a role in communicating the Church’s message and 
“carrying out its mission”—a minister’s central functions.34 
B. Biel v. St. James School: Factual Background and Procedural History 
In 2018, in Biel v. St. James School, the Ninth Circuit considered whether 
Kristen Biel, a fifth-grade teacher at St. James Catholic School in Los Angeles, 
was a minister for purposes of the ministerial exception.35 Biel brought a claim 
against the school under the ADA when the school refused to renew her con-
tract shortly after she requested time off to undergo treatment for breast can-
cer.36 The school alleged that Biel was a minister, and that she consequently 
could not bring an employment discrimination action against it.37 The United 
States District Court for the Central District of California agreed and granted 
the school’s motion for summary judgment.38 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit analyzed Biel’s background, training, title, 
role, and the extent to which the school presented her as a minister to the 
community.39 Unlike Perich in Hosanna-Tabor, Biel had no formal title indi-
cating she was a minister, nor did she complete any religious education to ob-
                                                                                                                           
 32 Id. at 192. For example, when filing her taxes, Perich claimed a unique housing allowance that 
only employees earning compensation for ministry work can claim. Id. The Court reasoned that this 
indicated she thought of herself as a minister and presented herself as such. Id. 
 33 Id. Perich taught religion four days a week, led her students in prayer several times a day, took 
her students to chapel once a week, and led chapel service twice a year. Id. 
 34 Id. Perich’s position required that she “lead others toward Christian maturity” and perform her 
job “according to the Word of God and the confessional standards of the Evangelical Lutheran Church 
as drawn from the Sacred Scriptures.” Id. In his concurrence, Justice Alito cautioned against placing too 
much significance on the formal title of the employee, given differences among religions, and instead 
emphasized the importance of the employee’s function in determining whether the ministerial exception 
should apply. Id. at 198–99 (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that “any employee who leads a religious 
organization, conducts worship services or important religious ceremonies or rituals, or serves as a 
messenger or teacher of its faith” should qualify as a minister). Such singular emphasis did not appear 
in the majority opinion. See id. at 191–92 (Roberts, C.J.) (stating that many factors led to the Court’s 
conclusion that Perich was a minister). Justice Thomas also filed a separate concurrence and argued 
that, in determining whether an employee is a minister, courts should “defer to a religious organiza-
tion’s good faith understanding.” Id. at 196–97 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 35 Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603, 605 (9th Cir. 2018), rev’d, Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. 
v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2069 (2020). Biel taught all academic subjects, including reli-
gion, as these subjects were part of the school’s required curriculum. Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at 606. 
 38 Biel v. St. James Sch., No. 15-cv-04248, 2017 WL 5973293, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 24, 2017). 
 39 Biel, 911 F.3d at 605–09 (stating and applying the factors that the Court considered in Hosan-
na-Tabor to Biel’s employment); see Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 191–92 (setting forth the factors 
that suggested Perich was a minister). 
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tain her position.40 Furthermore, unlike Perich, nothing in the record indicated 
that Biel considered herself a minister or purported to be one.41 The only simi-
larity between Biel and Perich was that they both performed various religious 
duties, as Biel taught religion lessons four days a week and highlighted reli-
gious themes in her general lesson plans.42 
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit held that Kristen Biel was not a minister for 
purposes of the ministerial exception.43 It reasoned that courts should not con-
strue the ministerial exception to provide religious institutions with immunity 
from employment discrimination claims of employees who do not act as reli-
gious leaders.44 As such, the court stated that religious institutions are not ex-
empt from employment antidiscrimination statutes when a given employee has 
both religious and secular responsibilities but does not guide the faith commu-
nity in the way a congregation leader would.45 The Ninth Circuit noted that the 
Supreme Court’s holistic analysis in Hosanna-Tabor identified four character-
istics of Perich’s employment that informed the Court’s conclusion that she 
was a religious leader.46 Yet, the Court only reached such a conclusion after 
                                                                                                                           
 40 Biel, 911 F.3d at 608; see Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 191 (analyzing the characteristics of 
Perich’s employment). The school gave Biel the title of “Grade 5 Teacher,” and she was a liberal 
studies major in college but completed no religious courses while obtaining her degree. Biel, 911 F.3d 
at 605, 608. The only religious training that Biel received was a half-day religious conference that 
covered ways to incorporate religious lessons into a curriculum in addition to various secular topics. 
Id. at 605. 
 41 Biel, 911 F.3d at 608–09; see Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 191–92 (noting that Perich claimed a 
tax credit exclusively reserved for ministers). Unlike Perich, whom the school could only terminate by 
a congregation supermajority vote, Biel was an at-will employee with a yearlong contract. Id. at 605, 
608; see Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 191 (describing Perich’s termination process). 
 42 Biel, 911 F.3d at 609; see Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 192 (describing Perich’s duties such as 
teaching religion classes, leading prayer, and occasionally leading chapel service). Biel taught her stu-
dents religion four days a week from a book the school provided. Biel, 911 F.3d at 605. She prayed 
with her students, but she did not lead her students in prayer. Id. She attended a monthly school mass 
with her students, at which her predominant responsibility was to make sure they behaved. Id. Biel 
was Catholic, although St. James School did not require that its teaching candidates be Catholic to 
hire them. Id. Biel’s employment contract and the St. James School faculty handbook did contain 
various religious mission statements, however, and the school did evaluate her in part by the way she 
incorporated those themes into her classroom. Id. at 605–06. 
 43 Biel, 911 F.3d at 605. 
 44 Id. at 611 (arguing that the ministerial exception does not provide “carte blanche to disregard 
antidiscrimination laws”). The policy behind the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, as noted in 
Hosanna-Tabor, centered on the founders’ intent to prevent the government from choosing church 
leadership, as was the case under the British monarchy. Id. at 610. Although the applicability of the 
exception is not exclusive to “the head of a religious congregation,” the focus is on religious leader-
ship and thus the exception need not apply to all employees who serve a religious function. Id. (quot-
ing Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188). 
 45 Id. at 610–11. 
 46 Id. at 607, 610. 
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considering all four characteristics.47 Accordingly, the fact that Biel’s employ-
ment only satisfied one of the four factors indicated that she did not serve as a 
religious leader in the way a congregation leader would.48 Therefore, her em-
ployment did not fall within the realm of the exception.49 
C. Morrissey-Berru v. Our Lady of Guadalupe School: Factual  
Background and Procedural History 
In 2019, in Morrissey-Berru v. Our Lady of Guadalupe School, the Ninth 
Circuit once again considered whether the ministerial exception applied to a 
teacher at a Catholic elementary school.50 Agnes Morrissey-Berru, a former fifth 
and sixth grade teacher at Our Lady of Guadalupe School, brought a claim under 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act against the school.51 The school 
claimed Morrissey-Berru qualified as a minister for purposes of the ministerial 
exception.52 The United States District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia agreed and accordingly granted the school summary judgment.53 On appeal, 
the Ninth Circuit followed the approach taken in Biel and evaluated Morrissey-
Berru’s formal title, training, religious responsibilities, and public persona as 
compared to those of Perich in Hosanna-Tabor.54 Morrissey-Berru did have sev-
eral religious responsibilities, including praying with her students daily, teaching 
                                                                                                                           
 47 See id. at 609 (noting that courts cannot interpret Hosanna-Tabor to mean that the ministerial 
exception applies solely on the basis of one shared characteristic because, if it did, the court’s careful 
four-characteristic analysis would amount to mere dicta). 
 48 Id. at 610 (noting that the only factor that Biel’s employment satisfied was that she performed 
religious duties by providing religious instruction). See supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text for 
further discussion of the court’s factor-based analysis. 
 49 Biel, 911 F.3d at 611. 
 50 Morrissey-Berru v. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 769 F. App’x 460, 460–61 (9th Cir. 2019), 
rev’d, Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2069 (2020). 
 51 Morrissey-Berru, 769 F. App’x at 460; see Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2056, 
2058 (noting that the crux of Morissey-Berru’s age discrimination claim was that the school demoted 
her and did not renew her contract in order to replace her with a younger teacher); see also Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (providing that it is illegal for 
an employer to make hiring and retention decisions based on an individual’s age). Morrissey-Berru 
taught all subjects, including religion, as the school required of all teachers at the Catholic school. Our 
Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2056. 
 52 Morrissey-Berru, 769 F. App’x at 460–61. 
 53 Morrissey-Berru v. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., No. 16-cv-09353, 2017 WL 6527336, at *2–3 
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2017). 
 54 Morrissey-Berru, 769 F. App’x at 461 (explicitly comparing Morrissey-Berru’s employment to 
Perich’s employment in Hosanna-Tabor (citing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. 
v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, 565 U.S. 171, 191–92 (2012))); see Biel, 911 F.3d at 605–09 
(employing a similar comparison of Biel’s employment to Perich’s employment characteristics in 
Hosanna-Tabor). 
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religion classes, and planning monthly Mass.55 Furthermore, her employment 
agreement required that she infuse Catholic lessons and values into her teaching 
plan.56 Similar to Biel, however, Morrissey-Berru had a secular title, minimal 
religious training, and did not present herself to the public as a minister.57 There-
fore, explicitly relying on its decision in Biel, the Ninth Circuit held that Morris-
sey-Berru was also not a minister for purposes of the ministerial exception.58 
The court reiterated that serving a religious function is not dispositive under the 
framework set out in Hosanna-Tabor.59 Even though Morrissey-Berru per-
formed various religious functions, the other aspects of her employment, namely 
her title, training, and public persona, were not ministerial.60 
D. The Road to the Supreme Court: Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. 
Morrissey-Berru Procedural History 
After the Ninth Circuit issued its decision in Biel in 2018, St. James 
School petitioned the Ninth Circuit for a panel rehearing, which the panel de-
nied in 2019.61 Judge Nelson dissented in the rehearing denial and alleged that 
the court’s narrow application of the ministerial exception constituted a sharp 
                                                                                                                           
 55 Morrissey-Berru, 769 F. App’x at 461. Morrissey-Berru taught her students religion every day 
from a textbook and prepared them for participation in Mass and Catholic sacraments. Our Lady of 
Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2057. 
 56 Morrissey-Berru, 769 F. App’x at 461. Morrissey-Berru was not Catholic, but her employment 
agreement required that she teach in a way that promoted the Catholic faith and its mission. See Our 
Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2057, 2078 (indicating that Morrissey-Berru was not Catholic). 
The school also evaluated her in accordance with a faculty handbook that established the same reli-
gious expectations. Id. at 2057. 
 57 Morrissey-Berru, 769 F. App’x at 461; see Biel, 911 F.3d at 608–09 (explaining why Biel was 
not a minister for the purposes of the exception). Morrissey-Berru’s official employment title was 
“Teacher.” Id. Her religious training only included one religious education course on the history of the 
Catholic Church. Id. She received a bachelor’s degree for completing an English Language Arts major 
and secondary education minor. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2078. 
 58 Morrissey-Berru, 769 F. App’x at 461 (citing Biel, 911 F.3d at 609). 
 59 Id.; see Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 194 (providing the framework for determining whether a 
teacher qualified as a minister). 
 60 Morrissey-Berru, 769 F. App’x at 461. 
 61 Biel v. St. James Sch., 926 F.3d 1238, 1239 (9th Cir. 2019) (denying en banc review). In 2018, 
the Ninth Circuit had decided Biel’s case as a three-judge panel. Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603, 
605 (9th Cir. 2018), rev’d, Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2069. Judge D. Michael Fisher, 
the dissenting judge in the panel decision, requested a vote on en banc rehearing. Id. at 605; Biel, 926 
F.3d at 1239. The Ninth Circuit denied the petition for rehearing en banc and denied St. James 
School’s petition for panel rehearing. Biel, 926 F.3d at 1239. A petition for panel rehearing is a re-
quest that a party submits to a judicial panel to ask that it reevaluate a prior decision because it “over-
looked or misapprehended” facts or law. Petition for Panel Rehearing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 
(11th ed. 2019); see FED. R. APP. P. 40 (providing the procedural requirements for a petition for panel 
rehearing). A petition for rehearing en banc asks that the full appellate court review an earlier panel 
decision that is inconsistent with the court’s precedent. Petition for Rehearing En Banc, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY, supra; see FED. R. APP. P. 35 (providing the procedure for a petition for rehearing 
en banc). 
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departure from the approaches of its fellow circuit courts.62 Judge Nelson ar-
gued that the other circuit courts’ application of the ministerial exception had 
determined that an employee’s religious function was the key determinant in 
whether an employee qualified as a minister under Hosanna-Tabor.63 He also 
noted that, although the four characteristics of Perich’s employment informed 
the Court’s conclusion in Hosanna-Tabor, it did not create a test for courts to 
use going forward.64 
St. James School and Our Lady of Guadalupe School separately filed peti-
tions for certiorari with the Supreme Court.65 Both petitions cited Judge Nelson’s 
dissent and argued that the Ninth Circuit’s narrow approach had effectively cre-
ated a circuit split regarding the effect of employee function on the application of 
the ministerial exception.66 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and consoli-
dated the two actions into Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru.67 
II. OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE SCHOOL V. MORRISSEY-BERRU 
In July 2020, in Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, the 
Supreme Court reversed both Ninth Circuit decisions, holding that Kristen Biel 
and Agnes Morrissey-Berru were ministers for purposes of the ministerial ex-
ception.68 The Court held that under the existing framework, the ministerial 
                                                                                                                           
 62 Biel, 926 F.3d at 1239 (Nelson, J., dissenting). Judges Bybee, Callahan, Bea, M. Smith, Ikuta, 
Bennett, Bade and Collins joined Judge Nelson’s dissent. Id. 
 63 Id. Several circuit courts gave the most weight to an employee’s religious function and often held 
the ministerial exception applied even if all four of the factors identified in Hosanna-Tabor were not 
applicable. See, e.g., Sterlinski v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 934 F.3d 568, 569–70, 572 (7th Cir. 2019) 
(emphasizing the function of the employee as the most important consideration); Lee v. Sixth Mount 
Zion Baptist Church of Pittsburgh, 903 F.3d 113, 122 n.7 (3d Cir. 2018) (explaining that the ministe-
rial exception applies if the employee will perform “spiritual functions”); Fratello v. Archdiocese of 
N.Y., 863 F.3d 190, 205 (2d Cir. 2017) (accepting guidance from Justice Alito’s concurrence in Ho-
sanna-Tabor that focused on the importance of the employee’s function); see also Hosanna-Tabor 
Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, 565 U.S. 171, 199 (2012) 
(Alito, J., concurring) (noting that the employee’s function is the most important factor in the ministe-
rial exception analysis). 
 64 Biel, 926 F.3d at 1242 (Nelson, J., dissenting); see Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 190 (holding 
that Perich was a minister for purposes of the ministerial exception). 
 65 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 19-
348), 2019 WL 4528125 (U.S. Sept. 16, 2019) [hereinafter St. James School Petition]; Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari, Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 769 F. App’x 460 (9th Cir. 2019) 
(No. 19-267), 2019 WL 4131225 (U.S. Aug. 28, 2019) [hereinafter Our Lady of Guadalupe School 
Petition]. A petition for a writ of certiorari is a request that the United States Supreme Court agree to 
review a lower court decision. See Certiorari, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 61 (defining 
certiorari). 
 66 See St. James School Petition, supra note 65, at 12–24 (highlighting Judge Nelson’s dissent); 
Our Lady of Guadalupe School Petition, supra note 65, at 14–26 (same). 
 67 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2049 (2020). 
 68 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2055 (2020); see also Mor-
rissey-Berru v. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 769 F. App’x 460, 460–61 (9th Cir. 2019), rev’d, Our 
Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2069 (holding that Morrissey-Berru was not a minister); Biel v. 
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exception encompassed employees who performed important religious duties, 
even when such employees did not have ministerial titles or extensive religious 
training backgrounds.69 Section A of this Part recounts the policies that the 
Court identified as grounding the ministerial exception and the way they influ-
enced the Court to conclude that employee function is the most essential con-
sideration of the analysis.70 Section B discusses the Court’s application of the 
ministerial exception to Biel and Morrissey-Berru and how the Court held that 
the Ninth Circuit erred in its application.71 Section C analyzes Justice So-
tomayor’s dissenting opinion that explored how the Court’s opinion may have 
strayed from its 2012 approach in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church & School v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.72 
A. An Employee’s Function Is the Most Important Factor  
in the Ministerial Exception Analysis 
Ultimately, in Our Lady of Guadalupe School, the Court concluded that 
“what an employee does” is the most important consideration in determining 
whether an employee qualifies as a minister for purposes of the exception.73 It 
reached that conclusion by extrapolating from the policy considerations under-
lying the ministerial exception.74 As the Court acknowledged in Hosanna-
Tabor, the founders designed the Establishment and Free Exercise clauses, at 
least in part, to protect religious institutions from government intrusion into 
“matters of faith and doctrine.”75 As such, the First Amendment provides a 
given religious institution with autonomy to decide which individuals will play 
essential roles in carrying out its central mission.76 This raises the question as 
to why a religious institution must be able to choose, retain, or terminate such 
                                                                                                                           
St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603, 605 (9th Cir. 2018), rev’d, Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 
2069 (holding that Biel was not a minister). Because the teachers fell within the scope of the ministe-
rial exception, courts could not hear employment discrimination actions brought against their employ-
ers. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2055. Kristen Biel passed away before the case reached 
the Supreme Court, so her husband, Daryl Biel, litigated the case on her behalf. Id. at 2058 n.6. 
 69 See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2052, 2066 (citing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical 
Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, 565 U.S. 171, 190–91 (2012)) (analyz-
ing, with respect to Biel and Morrissey-Berru, the four characteristics of ministerial function that the 
Court laid out in Hosanna-Tabor). Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Breyer, Alito, Kagan, 
Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined the opinion. Id. at 2052. 
 70 See infra notes 73–85 and accompanying text. 
 71 See infra notes 86–93 accompanying text. 
 72 See infra notes 94–101 and accompanying text. 
 73 See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2064 (emphasizing that employee function is 
the most significant indicator of ministerial role). 
 74 See id. at 2060–61, 2064 (analyzing the existing justifications for the ministerial exception). 
 75 See id. at 2060 (noting that state interference into such matters would violate religious institu-
tions’ free exercise of religion and constitute government establishment of religion). 
 76 See id. (noting, however, that even though religious institutions require autonomy in leadership 
decisions, that does not mean such institutions are generally exempt from secular laws). 
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individuals without government involvement in order to maintain its independ-
ence in “matters of faith and doctrine.”77 The Court reasoned that without such 
autonomy, ministers could preach, educate, or advise in a manner that contra-
dicted essential church doctrine and lead members of the faith astray.78 As 
such, the policy behind the ministerial exception is to insulate a religion’s mes-
sage and mission by exempting employees who serve these functions from 
secular regulation.79 
The Court held that what is most salient in determining whether the minis-
terial exception applies to a particular employee is whether the employee has a 
role in delivering the religious institution’s message and fulfilling its mission.80 
In Hosanna-Tabor, the four characteristics of Perich’s employment were rele-
vant because they indicated the extent to which she communicated the Church’s 
message and furthered its mission.81 Yet, the Court reasoned that the four char-
acteristics were not necessary to hold that Perich was a minister and, therefore, 
are not dispositive in other cases.82 Furthermore, the Court reasoned that treat-
ing some of the characteristics of Perich’s employment as necessary would be 
problematic.83 Namely, placing too much emphasis on a formal title like “min-
ister” or even on the amount of extensive religious training could create diffi-
cult line drawing problems and risk discrimination against faiths that do not 
have clear ministerial equivalents.84 As such, the majority held that the most 
                                                                                                                           
 77 See id. at 2060–61 (delving deeper into the importance of a religious institution’s autonomy 
under the First Amendment). 
 78 Id. 
 79 See id. (connecting a religious institution’s choice of minister to its broader implications). 
 80 See id. at 2063 (holding that employee function is the most important consideration in deter-
mining whether an employee is a minister). 
 81 See id. at 2063–64 (noting that Perich’s title of “minister” indicated that she had an important 
position built on trust, and that her extensive religious training indicated she understood Church doc-
trine and could communicate it effectively to her students); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, 565 U.S. 171, 191 (2012) (analyzing Perich’s 
title). 
 82 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2063 (reasoning that although there were four as-
pects of Perich’s employment that indicated she was a minister, that did not suggest those characteris-
tics must be present in future cases or would even be significant in deciding a different factual scenar-
io). 
 83 See id. at 2063–64 (indicating the drawbacks of requiring all four factors be present). 
 84 Id. An employee’s title of “minister” would not alone warrant invoking the exception, because 
it does not guarantee religious function. Id. In the same way, an employee’s lack of designation as 
“minister” does not alone preclude the application of the exception because it does not guarantee that 
the employee serves no religious function. Id. The term “minister” does not carry the same, if any, 
significance across all faiths. Id. at 2064. As such, if courts were to focus on formal title, it would 
have to decide which titles were sufficiently significant and would accordingly have to look to func-
tion anyway to make that determination. Id. Similarly, although training requirements for an employee 
might indicate a capacity to master and effectively communicate religious doctrine, an employee’s 
lack of training does not necessarily translate to an inability to convey religious messages. Id. Teach-
ing children religion, for example, may not require a sophisticated understanding of doctrine such that 
a teacher’s lack of training would not necessarily indicate she was not a minister. Id. 
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reliable method for identifying whether an employee should fall under the am-
bit of the ministerial exception is examining the employee’s function.85 
B. The Supreme Court Holds the Ninth Circuit Erred in Finding the 
Ministerial Exception Did Not Apply to Biel and Morrissey-Berru 
The Court applied its understanding of the ministerial exception to Kris-
ten Biel and Agnes Morrissey-Berru’s cases.86 It meticulously analyzed the 
facts of each case to ultimately reach the determination that both teachers car-
ried out essential religious responsibilities.87 The Court noted that both schools 
had strong religious missions and the objectives to educate and train their stu-
dents in the faith were ubiquitous.88 The terms of both teachers’ employment 
agreements required they help fulfill those missions.89 Furthermore, Biel and 
Morrissey-Berru took active measures to not only teach their students religious 
doctrine through their religion courses, but also to provide guidance on how to 
practice their faith.90 Although they did not have the same formal title or ex-
tensive religious training as Perich did in Hosanna-Tabor, their responsibilities 
were largely the same as Perich’s.91 Further, the Court stated that the Ninth Cir-
                                                                                                                           
 85 Id. at 2064. The Court reasoned that teaching often brings an employee within the ambit of the 
ministerial exception because religious education is one of the most prolific and important mechanisms 
for organized religions to communicate their doctrines and fulfill their missions. Id. at 2064–65. The 
crux of a religious school’s mission is to educate its students in religious doctrine and train them to be-
come fully participating members of the faith. Id. at 2064 (suggesting such reasoning was “implicit” in 
the majority’s opinion in Hosanna-Tabor (citing Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 198, 202 (Alito, J., 
concurring))). Teachers at religious schools play a direct role in communicating religious lessons and 
training students in faith. Id. at 2055, 2066. Accordingly, secular regulation of such teachers would in-
fringe on the religious school’s independence in “matters of faith and doctrine.” See id. at 2055, 2060 
(quoting Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 186) (connecting a school’s autonomy in choosing religious 
education instructors to the broader purposes underlying the ministerial exception). Thus, employees 
of religious institutions who provide religious instruction fall within the scope of the ministerial excep-
tion. Id. at 2064. The Court pointed to the specific importance of religious education in Catholicism, 
Protestantism, Judaism, Islam, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, and Seventh-day Ad-
ventism to reflect the essential role it plays across faiths. Id. at 2065–66. 
 86 Id. at 2066; see also Morrissey-Berru v. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 769 F. App’x 460, 460–
61 (9th Cir. 2019), rev’d, Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2069 (holding that Morrissey-
Berru was not a minister); Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603, 605 (9th Cir. 2018), rev’d, Our Lady 
of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2069 (holding that Biel was not a minister). 
 87 See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2056–2061, 2066 (providing a detailed analysis 
of the facts and holding that both teachers carried out religious functions). 
 88 Id. at 2066. 
 89 See id. (referencing Biel’s and Morrissey-Berru’s respective employment agreements and ap-
plicable faculty handbooks). The Court reasoned that this reflected the way in which the schools saw the 
teachers as crucial to the execution of their missions. Id. 
 90 See id. (reiterating that both teachers led their students in prayer, prepared them for various 
religious ceremonies, and attended Mass with them). 
 91 See id. (describing Perich’s title, training, and responsibilities in relation to Biel’s and Morris-
sey-Berru’s (citing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity 
Comm’n, 565 U.S. 171, 186, 190-91 (2012))). 
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cuit erred by giving too much consideration to title and formal training in its 
analysis of both cases.92 As such, the Court held that the functions of both teach-
ers indicated that they were ministers for purposes of the ministerial exception.93 
C. Potential Departure from Hosanna-Tabor: Justice Sotomayor’s Dissent 
Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, which argued that the Court ef-
fectively re-wrote Hosanna-Tabor in its application of the ministerial exception in 
Our Lady of Guadalupe School.94 She emphasized that, because the ministerial 
exception effectively grants religious institutions the ability to discriminate 
against their employees without repercussions, courts must limit it to only apply 
to church leadership.95 In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court identified the four character-
istics of Perich’s employment because they collectively suggested that she held an 
important leadership role in the Church.96 Justice Sotomayor reasoned that, alt-
hough an employee’s religious function informs the extent to which an employee 
is a religious leader, serving a religious function does not automatically make an 
employee a religious leader.97 She argued that the other three factors—title, reli-
gious training, and public presentation as a minister—were essential to the analy-
sis in Hosanna-Tabor, yet the Court improperly minimized their significance 
here.98 If the Court in Hosanna-Tabor did not find them to be important consider-
ations, it would not have wasted its time discussing them.99 Ultimately, she ar-
gued that the Court’s conversion of the holistic, leadership-focused analysis in 
Hosanna-Tabor to a function-focused analysis made the ministerial exception 
                                                                                                                           
 92 Id. at 2057. The Court even noted that Biel and Morrissey-Berru’s titles of teacher or Catholic 
school teacher indicated they were their students’ “primary teachers of religion.” Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 2071, 2075 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that Justice Alito’s majority opinion 
reframed his concurrence in Hosanna-Tabor, which only received two votes, to become the “touch-
stone” of Hosanna-Tabor); see also Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 198 (Alito, J., concurring) (suggest-
ing function is the most important consideration in the ministerial exception analysis). 
 95 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2072–73 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting the 
consensus among federal appellate courts prior to Hosanna-Tabor that religious leadership was the 
most important factor that led to multiple determinations that “lay faculty” did not qualify as ministers 
for purposes of the exception). 
 96 Id. at 2073–74 (conceding that, although Hosanna-Tabor did provide that the exception does 
not exclusively apply to “the head of a religious congregation,” its analysis served to identify whether 
Perich “personified” the faith and its mission (quoting Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188)). 
 97 Id. at 2076. 
 98 Id. at 2081; see Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 191–92 (analyzing Perich’s title, training, and 
presentation to the community as a minister). 
 99 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2080–81 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that the 
Court problematically did not even acknowledge the third factor—whether the religious institution 
held each employee out to the public as a minister). 
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overly broad.100 Furthermore, the holding threatened the employment antidis-
crimination rights of countless employees of religious institutions.101 
III. OUR LADY OF GUADALUPE V. MORRISSEY-BERRU PROBLEMATICALLY 
EXPANDED THE SCOPE OF THE MINISTERIAL EXCEPTION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in 2020, in Our Lady of Guadalupe School 
v. Morrissey-Berru problematically expanded the scope of the ministerial ex-
ception, such that more employees will now fall within the exception’s ambit 
and lose their federal employment antidiscrimination protections.102 The out-
come poignantly illustrates the reasons why future courts should nevertheless 
try to limit the scope of the exception as much as possible.103 Kristen Biel had 
breast cancer, and St. James School refused to renew her contract shortly after 
she asked for time off to seek chemotherapy treatment.104 She passed away 
before her case reached the Supreme Court, which forced her husband, Daryl, 
to litigate on her behalf.105 Because she served a religious function in her ca-
pacity as an elementary school teacher, Biel qualified as a minister under the 
ministerial exception.106 As such, her case is closed—her widowed husband 
has no opportunity to seek a remedy under an employment antidiscrimination 
statute.107 Effectively, it does not matter whether St. James School discriminat-
ed against her because of her disability.108 So long as Biel’s employment fell 
within the ambit of the exception, the school could have discriminated freely 
against her on any statutorily prohibited basis—even without religious justifi-
cation—and experience no legal repercussion in employment antidiscrimina-
tion law.109 
                                                                                                                           
 100 Id. at 2082. 
 101 Id. 
 102 See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2082 (Sotomayor, J. 
dissenting) (noting that the majority’s opinion broadens the ministerial exception in a way that will 
likely threaten the antidiscrimination protections of innumerable employees). 
 103 See id. at 2071 (emphasizing the lamentable facts surrounding both teachers’ terminations and 
the reality that the majority’s opinion wholly protects their employers from potentially viable discrim-
ination claims). 
 104 Biel v. St. James Sch., 911 F.3d 603, 605 (9th Cir. 2018), rev’d, Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 
140 S. Ct. at 2069 (explaining the circumstances surrounding the end of Biel’s employment with St. 
James School). 
 105 Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2058 n.6. 
 106 Id. at 2066. 
 107 See id. at 2055 (stating that the First Amendment bars courts, under the ministerial exception, 
from hearing employment discrimination claims that employees who qualify as ministers bring). 
 108 See id. at 2072 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting) (arguing that the exception shields the employer 
regardless of whether it discriminated against the employee). 
 109 See id. (noting that the ministerial exception allows an employer to discriminate on the basis 
of statutorily protected grounds notwithstanding whether such discrimination is “wholly unrelated to 
the employer’s religious beliefs or practices,” such that the employer need not even provide a religious 
justification). See generally George L. Blum, Annotation, Application of First Amendment’s “Ministe-
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Section A of this Part argues that, from a policy standpoint, the ministerial 
exception should only apply in a narrow set of circumstances because it poses 
a threat to the efficacy of statutory employee antidiscrimination protections.110 
Section B proposes that, even though Our Lady of Guadalupe School certainly 
expanded the scope of the ministerial exception, the extent of the expansion 
will depend on whether courts interpret the opinion itself broadly or narrow-
ly.111 Finally, Section C argues that courts should apply the narrowest interpre-
tation of Our Lady of Guadalupe School in future ministerial exception cases 
to protect against abuse deriving from religious deference.112 
A. The Policy Argument for a Ministerial Exception  
That Is Narrow in Scope 
As a matter of general policy, the ministerial exception should apply to as 
few employees as possible, because a broad application has the potential to 
undermine the statutory employment antidiscrimination protections of millions 
of American workers.113 Employment discrimination on the basis of statutorily 
protected classes and identities continues to pervade American society.114 Ap-
proximately two million workers in the United States are employees of reli-
gious organizations.115 When the ministerial exception applies, it grants incred-
ible deference to religious employers, and leaves employees with a stark lack 
of legal recourse.116 Such religious organizations are well aware of the poten-
                                                                                                                           
rial Exception” or “Ecclesiastical Exception” to Federal Civil Rights Claims, 41 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 445, 
I § 2 (2009) (discussing the ways in which some courts’ application of the First Amendment’s minis-
terial exception has barred employees of religious institutions’ claims of discrimination on the basis of 
statutorily protected classes other than religion, including, but not limited to, race, national origin, and 
sex). 
 110 See infra notes 113–119 and accompanying text. 
 111 See infra notes 120–135 and accompanying text. 
 112 See infra notes 136–140 and accompanying text. 
 113 See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2082 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting) (arguing that a 
sweeping ministerial exception poses an untold threat to the antidiscrimination protections of employ-
ees). 
 114 See Brief of National Women’s Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents 
at 9–22, Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. 2049 (No. 19-267 & 19-348) [hereinafter Brief of 
National Women’s Law Center] (describing in detail the extent to which “women, people of color, 
older workers, workers with disabilities, LGBTQ workers, immigrant workers, and those with multi-
ple and intertwining identities” still experience employment discrimination). 
 115 See Brief of The National Employment Lawyers Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Respondents at 15, Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. 2049 (No. 19266 & 19–348) [hereinaf-
ter Brief of National Employment Lawyers Association] (providing the data regarding employment of 
religious organizations (citing Occupational Employment Statistics, May 2016 National Industry-
Specific Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates, NAICS 8131-Religious Organizations, U.S. 
BUREAU LABOR STATISTICS (Mar. 30, 2018), http://www.bls.gov/oes/2017/may/naics4_813100.htm 
[https://perma.cc/LJD4-4GGE])). 
 116 See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2072–73 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing 
that because the ministerial exception constitutes a significant break from antidiscrimination law, 
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tial immunity the ministerial exception affords to them and have attempted to 
bring more types of employees, employers, and claims within the exception’s 
scope.117 Some organizations have even gone so far as to explicitly provide 
religious employers with guidance for avoiding civil rights lawsuits by using 
the ministerial exception.118 As such, to expand the scope of the ministerial 
exception is to deprive more workers of the antidiscrimination protections that 
Congress intended to provide to them.119 
                                                                                                                           
courts have and should construe it narrowly). Justice Sotomayor noted that when the Supreme Court 
accepted the ministerial exception in 2012, in Hosanna-Tabor, it ratified the holdings of the federal 
appellate courts. See id. (citing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp. 
Opportunity Comm’n, 565 U.S. 171, 188 (2012)); see, e.g., Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presby-
terian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 363 n.3 (8th Cir. 1991) (providing an example of one such decision that 
the Court recognized). The federal appellate courts were cognizant of the “potential for abuse” deriv-
ing from the ministerial exception, and therefore, evaluated whether an employee was a minister on a 
case-by-case basis, focusing primarily on religious leadership status. See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 
140 S. Ct. at 2072–73 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Scharon, 929 F.2d at 363 n.3; Rayburn v. 
Gen. Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168–69 (4th Cir. 1985)). By making 
leadership the focus of the analysis, Justice Sotomayor reasoned that the federal appellate courts had 
cabined the exception in such a way that “generally applicable laws” would still protect the majority 
of employees of religious institutions. Id. at 2073. 
 117 See Brief of National Women’s Law Center, supra note 114, at 22–26 (detailing the ways in 
which religious employers have tried to expand the ministerial exception). Religious employers have 
asserted the exception against employees who were not church leaders or religious teachers. Id. at 23; 
see, e.g., Richardson v. Nw. Christian Univ., 242 F. Supp. 3d 1132, 1143–46 (D. Or. 2017) (college 
professors with no ties to religious mission); Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 11–CV–00251, 
2013 WL 360355 at *1, *4 (S.D. Ohio Jan 30, 2013) (computer technicians); Davis v. Balt. Hebrew 
Congregation, 985 F. Supp. 2d 701, 711 (D. Md. 2013) (facilities workers); Patsakis v. Greek Ortho-
dox Archdiocese of Am., 399 F. Supp. 2d 689, 690, 693–95 (W.D. Pa. 2004) (other administrative or 
support staff); Smith v. Raleigh Dist. of N.C. Conference of the United Methodist Church, 63 
F. Supp. 2d 694, 697–97, 703–07 (E.D.N.C. 1999) (secretaries and receptionists). Religious employ-
ers that are not churches or religious schools have also claimed the exception. Brief of National Wom-
en’s Law Center, supra note 114, at 25–26; see, e.g., Penn v. N.Y. Methodist Hosp., 884 F.3d 416, 
423–26 (2d Cir. 2018) (hospital); Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 475–78 (7th Cir. 2008) 
(rehabilitation center); Shaliehsabou v. Hebrew Home of Greater Wash., Inc., 363 F.3d at 299, 309–11 
(4th Cir. 2004) (nursing home); Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Pac. Press Pub. Ass’n, 676 F.2d 
1272, 1277–78 (9th Cir. 1982) (publisher). Furthermore, religious employers have claimed that the 
First Amendment’s exception bars any suit that a minister employee files against their employer—
even those that do not pertain to hiring or firing. Brief of National Women’s Law Center, supra note 
114, at 24; see, e.g., Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Parish, 343 F. Supp. 3d 772, 779 (N.D. Ill. 
2018) (hostile work environment claim). See generally Vin Gurrieri, Justices May Take New Shot at 
Balancing Religion and Bias, LAW360 (Sept. 25, 2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1311355/
justices–may–take–new–shot–at–balancing–religion–and–bias [https://perma.cc/29VX-XRYR] (dis-
cussing whether the ministerial exception protects religious employers from hostile work environment 
claims). 
 118 See, e.g., Brief of National Women’s Law Center, supra note 114, at 30–31 (citing ALLIANCE 
DEFENDING FREEDOM, THE LUTHERAN CHURCH—MISSOURI SYNOD, PROTECTING YOUR MINISTRY 
FROM SEXUAL ORIENTATION GENDER IDENTITY LAWSUITS (2016), https://bit.ly/2U3RhPB [https://
perma.cc/A5X7-B3FY]) (referencing a specific guide designed to help congregations, schools, and 
ministries prepare for civil rights lawsuits by taking advantage of the exception). 
 119 See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2072–73, 2082 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(noting that the ministerial exception is a judicially-created doctrine that provides exceptions for reli-
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B. Our Lady of Guadalupe School Expanded the Scope of the  
Ministerial Exception, Although the Extent Depends  
on Which Interpretation Future Courts Apply 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Our Lady of Guadalupe 
School expanded the ministerial exception and eroded its limitations by hing-
ing its applicability on whether an employee serves a religious function.120 The 
extent to which the decision expands the scope of the ministerial exception, 
however, depends on which of two plausible interpretations of the Court’s rea-
soning for defining religious function future courts apply.121 
A narrower reading of the Court’s opinion suggests that an employee only 
qualifies as a minister when she actually performs various religious duties that 
are consistent with communicating religious messages and guiding the faith 
                                                                                                                           
gious employers that exceed those Congress provided by statute); see also Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (stating that the purpose of the ADEA is “to 
promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age 
discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising 
from the impact of age on employment”); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12101(b) (stating that the purpose of the ADA is to “provide a clear and comprehensive national 
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities” as well as “clear, 
strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabili-
ties”); Lenzi v. Systemax, Inc., 944 F.3d 97, 100 (2d Cir. 2019) (stating that Title VII has a broad 
remedial purpose that “counsels against interpretations of Title VII that deprive victims of discrimina-
tion of a remedy, without clear congressional mandate” (quoting Washington County v. Gunther, 452 
U.S. 161, 178 (1981))); cf. Bostock v. Clayton Cnty, Georgia, 170 S. Ct. 1731, 1753–54 (2020) (not-
ing explicitly—while recognizing sexual orientation and gender identity as protected classes under 
Title VII for the first time—that the ministerial exception is a potential avenue for religious employers 
to evade compliance with Title VII prohibitions of employment discrimination on such bases). 
 120 See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2075–76, 2082 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(noting that the function-focused analysis is what expanded the exception). In Hosanna-Tabor, the 
Court’s totality of the circumstances approach for determining whether an employee qualified as a 
minister worked to limit the scope of the ministerial exception to church leadership. See id. at 2073–
74 (noting that the collective circumstances of Perich’s employment showed that she was a leader in 
her church (citing Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity 
Comm’n, 565 U.S. 171, 190–92 (2012))). Without such a holistic analysis, more employees of more 
religious institutions are likely to fall within the ambit of the ministerial exception after Our Lady of 
Guadalupe School. See id. at 2082 (noting the expanded breadth of the exception due to the Court’s 
new “religious function” approach). 
 121 See The Bigotry of Low Expectations, STRICT SCRUTINY (Jul. 14, 2020), https://strictscrutiny
podcast.com/podcast/low-expectations/ [https://perma.cc/27M7-EYBG] (suggesting that one can 
interpret the opinion broadly or narrowly and that in order for Justice Kagan and Justice Breyer to 
have signed on to the opinion without writing separately they must have thought that courts could 
interpret the scope narrowly). But see Noah Feldman, Why Supreme Court Liberals Joined Conserva-
tives on Religion, BLOOMBERG (July 8, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-07-
08/supreme-court-expands-religious-exemptions-with-liberals-help [https://perma.cc/RJY3-7ZTH] 
(arguing Justices Breyer and Kagan may have joined the majority to demonstrate their willingness to 
cross traditional ideological lines). 
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community.122 In short, whether an employee performs a religious function 
depends on the nature of the employee’s duties.123 Under this interpretation, 
even if an employer set forth an umbrella mission statement that characterized 
all of the work done through the institution as furthering the religion’s message 
and mission, employees would not fall within the ambit of the exception absent 
some explicit religious action taken.124 Such a reading confines the exception 
in the sense that it would only apply to employees who carry out discernibly 
religious duties.125 
Yet, courts might also interpret Our Lady of Guadalupe School more 
broadly to mean an employee’s religious function is defined, not in terms of 
                                                                                                                           
 122 See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2066 (holding that educating students in faith is 
an essential religious function). The Court reasoned that the policy underlying the ministerial excep-
tion was needed to insulate a given religious institution’s message by refraining from applying secular 
standards to the employees who deliver that message. Id. at 2060–61. 
 123 See id. (noting that religious education, for example, is essential to many faiths in the United 
States, and therefore, teaching religion is a crucial responsibility). As such, a teacher who teaches her 
students religion classes would qualify as a minister, but a teacher who teaches no religion classes and 
performs no other religious duties would not qualify. See The Bigotry of Low Expectations, supra note 
121 (inferring that under this reading, a teacher who instructs on global religion but does not teach or 
instill the religious institution’s faith, would not fall within the ambit of the exception and could ac-
cordingly bring an antidiscrimination action). 
 124 See The Bigotry of Low Expectations, supra note 121 (explaining this possible interpretation). 
 125 See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2063 (noting that important ministerial func-
tions include leading a religious group, guiding worship, or acting “as a messenger or teacher of the 
faith” (quoting Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 199 (Alito, J., concurring))). Nevertheless, this narrower 
interpretation still does not clearly define the limitations of the exception because it does not address how 
much religious function an employee must perform to qualify as a minister. See Transcript of Oral Ar-
gument at 18:18–21:24, Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. 2049 (Nos. 19–267 & 19–348) (hint-
ing at this problem); see also Amy Howe, Argument Analysis: Justices Divided in Debate Over “Min-
isterial Exception,” SCOTUSBLOG (May 11, 2020), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/05/argument–
analysis–argument–analysis–justices–divided–in–debate–over–ministerial–exception/ [https://perma.
cc/TQ2R-8Z6Z] (noting that during oral argument, several justices appeared to be concerned about the 
challenges of line drawing regarding the amount of religious activity an employee must partake in to 
be considered a minister). Justice Kagan acknowledged this problem in oral argument when she posed 
Eric Rassbach, counsel representing the schools, with a series of hypotheticals where employees had 
varying degrees of religious responsibilities and asked whether each would qualify as a minister. See 
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra, at 18:18–21:24. Among the hypotheticals Justice Kagan posed 
were, 1) “a math teacher who is told to teach something about Judaism for ten minutes a week,” 2) “a 
math teacher who was told to embody Jewish values and infuse instruction with Jewish values,” 3) “a 
nurse at a Catholic hospital who prays with sick patients and is told otherwise to tend to their religious 
needs,” 4) “an employee at a soup kitchen who distributes religious literature and leads grace before 
meals.” Id. Rassbach replied that in each of these hypotheticals, with the exception of the third involv-
ing the nurse, the amount of religious activity performed by the employee would be “de minimis,” 
such that he or she would not fall within the realm of the exception. See id. (responding to Justice 
Kagan’s hypotheticals); see also Mark Joseph Stern, The Supreme Court Considers Exempting Reli-
gious Employers from All Religious Discrimination Laws, SLATE (May 11, 2020), https://slate.com/
news-and-politics/2020/05/religious-employers-supreme-court-argument-discrimination.html [https://
perma.cc/GY8K-DQSW] (highlighting the same exchange between Justice Kagan and Rassbach, as 
well as Justice Ginsburg’s attempts to clarify the exception’s limits). 
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the function itself, but rather, vis-à-vis the religious institution’s mission.126 In 
other words, an employee serves a religious function if she performs duties 
that are essential to carrying out the religious institution’s mission.127 To illus-
trate, the central mission of both St. James School and Our Lady of Guadalupe 
School was to educate young members of the faith.128 As teachers, Biel and 
Morrissey-Berru each played a direct and central role in education generally.129 
Thus, in order to maintain independence in carrying out its religious mission, 
each school required autonomy in selecting which individuals would play this 
important role.130 
The broader, autonomy-focused interpretation has much more sweeping 
implications, namely because it defers to the religious institution with regard to 
how the mission is defined.131 The more generally defined the mission, the 
more likely it is to encompass employees who might not otherwise qualify as 
ministers.132 Without entertaining a parade of horribles, one can imagine a va-
riety of situations in which a religious institution that serves both religious and 
secular purposes expansively defines its religious mission, such that the major-
ity of its employees perform functions essential to that mission.133 This reading 
                                                                                                                           
 126 See Brief of National Women’s Law Center, supra note 114, at 28–29 (arguing that the func-
tion test significantly expands which employees will qualify as ministers, because, for example, a 
school could design its mission statement such that all staff perform essential religious functions); see 
also The Bigotry of Low Expectations, supra note 121 (arguing that it is plausible that courts will 
interpret the opinion will more broadly, such that religious institutions can craftily define their mission 
statements to encompass more employees). 
 127 See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2066 (noting the pertinence of a religious insti-
tution’s description of the religious importance of an employee’s responsibilities); see also The Bigot-
ry of Low Expectations, supra note 121 (arguing that if Justices Kagan and Breyer only signed on to 
the opinion because they thought it could be narrowly limited to functions related to raising future 
members of the faith, that it was naïve, because sweeping religious missions are easy to craft). 
 128 See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. 2066 (noting that “educating and forming stu-
dents in the Catholic faith lay at the core of the mission of the schools where they taught”). 
 129 See id. (noting that Biel’s and Morrissey-Berru’s employment agreements and handbooks 
specified that they were to help carry out the mission of teaching and guiding students in the faith, and 
as teachers, they were given the most direct responsibility of that mission). 
 130 See id. at 2060 (explaining the need for autonomy in hiring and retaining employees who per-
form essential religious responsibilities derives from religious institutions’ broader protection from 
government interference into church administration decisions). 
 131 See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2076 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting) (arguing that 
placing a heightened importance on functionality is especially problematic because it relies on the 
notion that religious institutions are best situated to explain the importance of a function, effectively 
allowing employers to decide when discrimination will be actionable, which invites manipulation); 
see also Feldman, supra note 121 (arguing that by making the autonomy of religious institutions a 
central basis for the ministerial exception, the Court re-wrote the exception to make it much more far-
reaching in practice). 
 132 See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2082 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (linking the 
scope of the exception to the number of employees who will fall within its ambit). 
 133 See id. (noting the various different professions in which those who work for religious institu-
tions may lose their protections, including “coaches, camp counselors, nurses, social-service workers, 
in-house lawyers, media relations personnel”); see also Feldman, supra note 121 (arguing that under 
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of the Court’s decision incentivizes religious institutions to define their mis-
sion statements broadly enough to create a link between employee function 
and the institution’s core religious mission.134 By defining their missions in 
such a way, religious institutions will be able to freely discriminate against 
their employees without fear of recourse, as many of their employees will ef-
fectively fall within the scope of ministerial exception.135 
C. Future Courts Applying the Ministerial Exception After Our Lady  
of Guadalupe School Should Interpret the Court’s Opinion  
Narrowly as a Way to Confine the Exception’s Scope 
Going forward, it is imperative that courts apply Our Lady of Guadalupe 
School in accordance with its narrower interpretation by which religious func-
tion is defined in terms of whether the function itself has religious im-
portance.136 Although Our Lady of Guadalupe’s emphasis on function expand-
                                                                                                                           
the prior Hosanna-Tabor ministerial exception framework, professors of secular subjects at Catholic 
universities would not be exempt from federal unionization laws but, under the new Our Lady of 
Guadalupe School framework, they likely would be); The Bigotry of Low Expectations, supra note 
121 (posing a hypothetical where a Catholic charity drafts a mission statement that states that it per-
forms its work in accordance with the tenets of the Catholic faith and each employee acts as an exam-
ple of the faith). See generally Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581, 590–91 (1990) (explaining that the well-known “parade of horribles” is a 
phrase used in legal writing to describe a critic’s depiction of the undesirable consequences of a given 
principle using specific examples). 
 134 See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2082 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting) (noting the 
Court’s “laissez-faire analysis” green lights employment discrimination on the basis of an otherwise 
protected class); Brief of National Employment Lawyers Association, supra note 115, at 19 (arguing 
that the function test could subject a significant amount of employees of religious institutions to the 
ministerial exception because an employer could easily argue that all functions are religious); see also 
Mark Joseph Stern, The Supreme Court Just Gave Religious Employers a License to Discriminate 
Against Workers, SLATE (July 8, 2020), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/07/supreme-court-
ministerial-exception-religious-employers.html [https://perma.cc/Z3JW-3HMK] (arguing that every 
capable attorney representing religious institutions will now advise such institutions to give every 
employee some nominal religious duties as a way to defend against discrimination suits). 
 135 See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2076 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting) (arguing that 
the Court’s decision welcomes the “potential for abuse” that federal circuit courts had cautioned 
against (citing Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hosps., 929 F.2d 360, 363 n.3 (8th Cir. 
1991))); see also supra note 116 and accompanying text for further discussion of the federal circuit 
courts’ prior concerns regarding abuse of the ministerial exception. 
 136 See supra notes 122–125 and accompanying text (discussing the way the narrower interpreta-
tion operationalizes). But see Nelson Tebbe & Micah Schwartzman, Re-upping Appeasement: Reli-
gious Freedom and Judicial Politics in the 2019 Term 17 (Va. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Res. Paper No. 
2020-68, Cornell Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 20-40, 2020), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3694589 
[https://perma.cc/VLR8-V227] (arguing that there is very little in the Court’s opinion in Our Lady of 
Guadalupe that will prevent the conservative Roberts Court from expanding the exception further). 
Justice Alito’s concurrence in Hosanna-Tabor might actually provide a helpful starting point in determin-
ing which functions are of such religious importance that they bring employees who perform them within 
the scope of the exception. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp. 
Opportunity Comm’n, 565 U.S. 171, 199 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (stating that the exception 
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ed the exception, courts still can—and should—confine the ministerial excep-
tion by only applying it to employees who have discernibly essential religious 
functions.137 For example, religious instruction may concededly be so crucial 
to a religious institution’s communication of its message that religious teachers 
rightfully fall within the ambit of the exception.138 This principle does not re-
quire, however, that employees who play no significant part in delivering reli-
gious messages or leading the faith community should also fall within the am-
bit of the exception.139 Rather than blindly deferring to a religious institution 
with regard to whether an employee serves a salient religious function, courts 
should be skeptical of tactical attempts to qualify employees as ministers when 
they play no serious role in communicating religious messages or guiding the 
faith community.140 
                                                                                                                           
should include “any ‘employee’ who leads a religious organization, conducts worship services or 
important religious ceremonies or rituals, or serves as a messenger or teacher of its faith”).  
 137 See supra notes 116–119 and accompanying text (detailing the policy implications of an ex-
panded exception). The Court was aptly able to identify teaching as a ministerial function by painstak-
ingly emphasizing the importance of religious instruction to all organized religions in the United 
States, in part by citing to religious cannons and secondary sources. See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 
140 S. Ct. at 2064–66 (describing the practices of various religions). Presumably, it could perform the 
same exercise in determining whether a receptionist performs sufficiently important religious duties to 
qualify as a minister. See Stern, supra note 134 (posing this specific scenario). In 2021, the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts applied Our Lady of Guadalupe narrowly and held that a social work 
professor at a religious university was not a minister for purposes of the exception because her specif-
ic functions were not religious. See DeWeese-Boyd v. Gordon Coll., SJC-12988, 2021 Mass. LEXIS 
147, at *3 (Mar. 5, 2021) (noting she did not provide religious instruction, guide her students in prayer 
or usher them to religious proceedings, give sermons, or perform any other religious responsibility). 
The court acknowledged that the professor did have a general duty to incorporate her faith into the 
way she taught and studied social work. Id. at *3–4. The university argued that this general duty was 
enough to qualify the professor as a minister under Our Lady of Guadalupe. Id. at *36–37. The court, 
however, rejected the university’s argument. Id. at *36–38. It noted that although one could interpret 
some language in Our Lady of Guadalupe expansively, interpreting it in this way would drastically 
increase the scope of the exception and impermissibly destroy antidiscrimination protection statutes. 
Id. This Comment endorses the Supreme Judicial Court’s analysis and holding in Deweese-Boyd as a 
model for future courts to use in ministerial exception cases. See supra notes 136–137 and accompa-
nying text; infra notes 138–140 and accompanying text (arguing for a narrow interpretation of Our 
Lady of Guadalupe). 
 138 See Feldman, supra note 121 (suggesting Justices Breyer and Kagan’s votes were justified, 
because it was reasonable to include teachers who taught religion and worshipped with their students 
within the scope of the ministerial exception); see also Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 
2064–66 (discussing the importance of religious instruction). 
 139 See The Bigotry of Low Expectations, supra note 121 (arguing that courts might interpret Our 
Lady of Guadalupe Sch. so that employees who do not teach religion do not fall within the exception); 
see also Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2063 (noting that the exception insulates those 
who deliver religious messages and act as religious leaders); supra notes 122–125 and accompanying 
text (discussing the way the narrower interpretation operationalizes). 
 140 See Brief of National Women’s Law Center, supra note 114, at 30–31 (showing how religious 
institutions are conscious of how they may use the exception to their advantage); see also supra notes 
118–119 for further discussion of religious efforts to pull more employees within the ambit of the 
II.-302 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:E. Supp. 
CONCLUSION 
When the ministerial exception applies to an employee of a religious in-
stitution, the implications are significant. The employee effectively loses much 
of the employment antidiscrimination safeguards that Congress intended to 
provide. Although religious institutions have a First Amendment interest in 
maintaining autonomy in selecting their religious leaders and those who take 
on important religious roles, courts should not enable them to exploit that au-
tonomy. As such, courts should construe the ministerial exception narrowly to 
protect the interests of as many employees of religious institutions as possible. 
In Our Lady of Guadalupe v. Morrissey-Berru, in 2020, the Supreme Court’s 
function analysis broadened the exception beyond its historic parameters. Yet, 
there is still an opportunity for future courts applying the ministerial exception 
to read the Court’s opinion narrowly. If “what an employee does” is really 
what is most salient in determining whether an employee is a minster, then 
courts should define that function in terms of whether the function itself is of 
general religious importance. 
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exception. See generally Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2063 (noting the importance of 
individuals preaching, advising, and instructing to a given faith). 
